Since its founding in 2002, the African Union has invested in building a regime of constitutionalism that outlaws politics by force and strengthens democracy. The regime, however, has been selectively enforced. The AU regularly invokes it to police military coups, but has never sanctioned incumbents for carrying out constitutional coups-despite rules prohibiting such transgressions. We account for this imbalance and its consequences for democracy and accountability in Africa. Incumbent instrumentalization of the regime is a key cause of lax enforcement but we argue it is compounded by the absence of bright-line rules against constitutional coups.
In Africa, the coup d'état has been mortally wounded. Politics still plays out in the shadow of violence-and will continue to-but forcible seizures of power are no longer the path to sovereign power they once were. This is a remarkable development. Since the 1960s, there have been more than 100 forcible seizures of power. The decline of the coup is one of the most significant policy achievements of the African Union (AU). Building on the Lomé Declaration passed by its predecessor, the Organization of African Unity, the AU has gone to great lengths to bar coup-makers from coming to power. This policy change is linked to the significant reduction of coups in Africa. 1 With the decline of forcible seizures of power, however, a troubling countertrend has emerged: the rise of the constitutional coup-in which incumbents manipulate their constitutions to remove or extend term limits to prolong their hold on power.
2 Despite adopting the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance in 2007 that committed to sanction such offenses as it would military coups, not once has the AU done so. In turning a blind eye to incumbents who trounce constitutional term limits, while shielding them from violent overthrow, 1 Powell, Jonathan, Trace Lasley, and Rebecca Schiel. 2016. "Combating Coups d'état in Africa, 1950- the AU is enabling a resurgence of personal rule and, as seen in Burundi and the Democratic Republic of the Congo, triggering new cycles of political instability and conflict.
What accounts for the AU's imbalanced regime of constitutionalism?
In many ways, the regime of constitutionalism that the AU has built and selectively enforces reflects the political interests of the "club of incumbents" 3 who comprise the regional organization. The regime enables autocratic incumbents to give a nod to "promoting democracy,"
while they consolidate their hold on power. This explanation is important but incomplete. It fails to account for the significant change in the institutional composition and preferences of member states in the lead up to and since the founding of the AU. Democratic elites, including a growing a number of incumbents, rival the powerful bloc of autocrats who have traditionally dominated the regional organization. The consequence is there is a growing constituency who see the African Charter not as a tool for protecting incumbent power, but for upholding basic democratic standards and practices with the goal of deepening democracy across the region.
These conflicting preferences between its autocratic and democratic members are a key potential impediment to regional collective action, especially over enforcement of the African
Charter. But, following from a long tradition in international law and law more generally, whether and how such divisions matter are, in turn, mediated by the clarity or precision of the regime's rules. 4 When the regime delineates "bright-line rules"-laws that are unambiguous in their interpretation and of which violations are easily observable and objectively verifiable- there is less room for member states to use discretionary power to impede enforcement. 5 For the AU's regime of constitutionalism, provisions outlawing forcible seizures of power and incumbents from clinging to power despite being voted out of office represent bright-line rules. There is little ambiguity surrounding what constitutes a military coup or when incumbents defy electoral defeat to stay in power. With no room for disagreement on whether these represent violations of the regime, the AU has acted to sanction transgressors. In contrast, the rules prohibiting constitutional coups represent more of a gray zone. Is a referendum to extend term limits in a country with restricted civil liberties "an infringement on the principles of democratic change of government" or an expression of the will of the people? This ambiguity hinders enforcement and opens the door for autocratic incumbents to exploit this gray zone to strengthen their grip on power.
The solution to this policy problem is clear. The AU needs to reduce the ambiguity surrounding its rules against constitutional coups. One bright-line rule in this regard has been proposed by the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), in its annual meeting in 2015: a universal two-term limit for incumbents in all member states. 6 In adopting such an unambiguous rule, which enjoys broad support from publics across African states, there will be less room for autocrats to cling to power indefinitely and it will strengthen the AU's ability to sanction incumbents who dare to transgress this clear-cut provision. The challenge is that the existing rules are no accident. Consistent with the idea that regime compliance is not merely an outcome, but a process, 7 during the writing of the African Charter autocratic incumbents intentionally blurred the lines prohibiting constitutional coups to weaken the constraints on their power. Fixing this will require a concerted and collective effort from democratic stakeholders to re-engage in the process and make a more balanced regime of constitutionalism. In the first few years of the AU's existence, coup plotters sought to exploit a loophole in the AU's anti-coup rule by forcibly seizing power and then, to avoid sanctions and suspension, restored the "constitutional order" by holding elections that they won-what Souaré refers to as auto-legitimation. 13 Coup plotters in Togo and Mauritania pulled this off before the AU closed this loophole. This new provision, included in the African Charter as well as endorsed by the AU Assembly in February 2010 at its Fourteenth Ordinary Session, has further strengthened the hand of democratic forces and blocked the coup as a path to sovereign power.
The one exception to the rule has been Egypt. For a year, the AU took a hardline position against the regime of Abdel Fattah el-Sisi, even as the United States and the European Union were more ambivalent and accepting of his seizure of power. But, then, in contravention of its rule against "auto-legitimation," the AU eventually lifted Egypt's suspension and recognized the Sisi government after he held and won a presidential election. The AU justified re-entry on grounds that having had the suspension in place for "close to a year…sent a strong message to the Egyptian stakeholders regarding AU's attachment to its principles and instruments" and it was necessary "for the AU to remain engaged with Egypt and to accompany the efforts of the Egyptian authorities for the full implementation of the Roadmap" (a transitional process outlined by the military government to restore democracy). 14 This concession came on the heels of an active diplomatic campaign by Egypt to be re-admitted back into the AU. This points to a potential limit of the AU's anti-coup rule: it is conditional on a target state's diplomatic clout and strategic linkages. 
Ensuring Incumbents Respect Election Outcomes
Beyond policing forcible seizures of power, the AU has also served as a third-party enforcer to uphold election outcomes when the incumbent refuses to accept defeat. In This conflict within the AU between autocratic incumbents who see the regime as a tool for consolidating their hold on power versus democratic elites who see it as a mechanism for strengthening democratic governance hinders collective action. But, following from a prominent body of scholarship in international law, we would expect this intra-organizational conflict and 21 This excludes regular transfers of power, such as the transition from Agostinho Neto to José Eduardo dos Santos in Angola in 1979, but in which the head of state was not elected into power. Both follow formal rules but can be distinguished whether they follow democratic procedures in a Schumpeterian sense. It also excludes rulers that initially came to power through non-electoral means but which were subsequently elected. We expect the socializing effects of democracy to be weaker among rulers who initially came to power by force but then accept elections.
regime enforcement to be mediated by the clarity of the rules of the regime. In contrast, the rules prohibiting constitutional coups represent more of a gray zone. For example, did Nkurunziza's petition to the Constitutional Court of Burundi to validate his third term bid represent "an infringement on the principles of democratic change of government" or adherence to the letter of the law? The fact that there were allegations that the Court was under duress to rubberstamp Nkurunziza's third term bid suggests the former. What about in Rwanda where citizens voted in a referendum to change the constitution to allow Paul Kagame to extend his reign? Is this an expression of the will of the people? Given the restrictions on civil liberties in Rwanda, the legitimacy of such an act is equally murky.
As seen in other international regimes, this ambiguity is a key cause of non-compliance and impediment to enforcement, especially in mixed-ratified regimes in which there is not universal commitment to the regime's tenets. 23 In In its current form, the AU's regime of constitutionalism is undermining democracy and increasing personal rule in Africa's most at-risk states. The solution to this problem is not to scrap anti-coup rules, which are proving effective at preventing violent seizures of power. Force is a powerful accountability mechanism but an inefficient one; it can do much more harm than good. 27 The solution is to strengthen constitutional constraints on incumbents. As is, the AU's regime of constitutionalism is failing on this dimension; it is giving a free pass to incumbents who cling to power indefinitely-as long as they do not lose elections.
We have argued that this is partially due to a lack of political will, but also a function of the ambiguity that shrouds Article 23, subsection 5 of the African Charter. An effective way for the AU to address this problem is to sharpen its rule against term limit changes. One simple solution was proposed by ECOWAS in its meeting in 2015: adopting a universal two-term limit for all member states. Under the weight of objections from two of its autocratic members-one of whom has since been ousted from power-ECOWAS tabled the proposal. 28 The African Union should pick up the mantle.
There are a number of advantages to such a rule. Mail and Guardian Africa, May 21, 2015. Available at http://mgafrica.com/article/2015-05-21-thirdterm-limit-not-for-us-west-african-presidents-say-adding-to-central-africa-led-push-back incumbent rulers to reset their tenure clock. Once the rule comes into effect, if an incumbent has already served two terms, he or she must step down after finishing the current term.
A second advantage is this rule will boost alternations of power in Africa, increasing elite buy-in and legitimacy for the democratic system. 29 Opposition parties in Africa are significantly more likely to win elections when the sitting president does not stand. 30 And electoral turnovers are further found to increase citizenry support for the democratic system.
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A third advantage is it will set the African Union apart as the most progressive regional body when it comes to constitutionalism. As noted, the organization has already made great strides in policing coups. It can also serve as the global torch-bearer for constitutional term limits.
Some African incumbents will surely object on two grounds. First, incumbents will argue that regionally-mandated term limits forfeit their citizenry's right to self-determination. If citizens want to have their leaders serve for life, why should they be denied that choice? But as has been widely noted, extensive survey data from Afrobarometer belies this argument.
According to data from Round 6 of the Afrobarometer survey, some 75 percent of citizens across 29 Maltz, Gideon. 2007 One concern is that this externally-mandated rule will inadvertently weaken democracy in member states by supplanting the democratizing effects of civil society, political parties and citizens being forced to mobilize to uphold term limits. Ideally demand for term limits would engender the mobilization of such local democratic forces-as has occurred in Nigeria in 2006
and Burkina Faso in 2014 and in Togo in 2017. But, of course, the need for this rule in the first place is that the AU's regime of constitutionalism is helping to stack the deck against such democratic forces by aiding incumbents to personalize power. The democratizing benefits that come from strict term limits and the alternations of power they induce should more than offset the democratic costs that come from their external enforcement.
Twenty years since African states began to rewrite the rules governing inter-state relations, force is no longer a viable path to sovereign power. This is a major achievement. But the AU's regime of constitutionalism is incomplete. Until incumbents face the same hard constraints as their rivals, personal rule-the bane of political and economic development in Africa-will persist. The AU can address this with a simple but bold policy change that is broadly supported across the continent and will give a powerful boost to democratic consolidation.
